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Abstract 
To a limited extent, post-9/11 U.S. media has begun to accommodate Middle Eastern identities 
that go beyond Orientalist binaries common to American film and television. By exploring 2 
reality television shows, All-American Muslim and Shahs of Sunset, this paper asks: How can we 
understand this increase in representations of Arabs, Iranians, and Muslims within U.S. popular 
culture?  Examining how Islam is represented (or not represented) in each show provides a 
window onto different media representational strategies, highlighting the possibilities and 
limitations of inclusion afforded by liberal multiculturalism and revealing the still-thorny cultural 
politics of Islam in a post-9/11 context.  
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The Cultural Politics of Islam in U.S. Reality Television 
 
There has been a noticeable increase in Middle Eastern Americans on U.S. reality television 
since 2009. To list just a few: In 2010, Rima Fakih was the first Arab American to win the Miss 
USA Pageant. She went on to train to be a professional wrestler on the USA network’s reality 
show, WWE Tough Enough (McMahon, V., 2011, season 5), and then appeared on FOX’s dating 
game show, The Choice (Smith, Weed, & St. John, 2012, season 1). Sahar Dika was the first 
Arab American Muslim to be cast on MTV’s The Real World (Goldschein, French, Johnston, & 
Murray, 2010, season 24). Selma Alameri was on the cast of ABC’s The Bachelor (Fleiss, 
Levenson, & Gale, 2013, season 17). And formerly married Paul Nassif and Adrienne Maloof 
were cast members on Bravo’s The Real Housewives of Beverly Hills (Baskin, Rupel, Ross, & 
Gallagher, 2010–2013, seasons 1–3). In addition to an increase in cast members of Middle 
Eastern descent on reality television, there has also been an increase in reality television shows 
that feature Middle Eastern identities. This article focuses on two such shows: TLC’s All-
American Muslim (Mosallam, M., Emmerson, N., O’Connell, J., & Peirson, D., 2011–2012), 
which chronicled the everyday lives of five middle-class Lebanese Muslim American families in 
Dearborn, Michigan, and Bravo’s Shahs of Sunset (Sher, A., Garnder, E., Curry, K., & Seacrest, 
R., 2012–present), which follows six affluent Muslim and Jewish Iranian American friends in 
Beverly Hills, California. 
How can we understand this increase in representations of Arabs, Iranians, and Muslims 
on reality television?  For some viewers, the increase is easily read as evidence of greater 
incorporation and acceptance of Middle Eastern and Muslim Americans into the U.S. cultural 
imaginary. While recognizing the value and, in many cases, good intentions of efforts to increase 
representations of stigmatized groups, I argue that we need to engage critically with the ways in 
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which reality television shows represent Arabs, Muslims, and Middle Eastern Americans. 
Specifically, what do the representational strategies of such shows tell us about how and whether 
these groups are accepted in the vision of a multicultural America? Comparing All-American 
Muslim and Shahs of Sunset provides a window onto different representational strategies and 
reveals, I suggest, the still-thorny cultural politics of Islam in a post-9/11 context and the limits 
of inclusion afforded by liberal multiculturalism.  
The work of scholars like Herman Gray and Stuart Hall has shown that simply including 
representations of underrepresented groups in the media does not solve the problem of 
stereotyping. More often than not, underrepresented groups are incorporated through rigid or 
limited portrayals that erase or minimize difference. Gray (2004, pp. 107–108) notes that 
television networks’ support of liberal pluralism since the 1980s has had a paradoxical effect: the 
elimination, repression, or incorporation of difference through co-optation. Similarly, Hall 
(1992) points out that the spaces “won” for difference are “very carefully policed and regulated . 
. . [such] that what replaces invisibility is a kind of carefully regulated, segregated visibility” (p. 
24). 
On the surface, reality TV seems to be the perfect antidote to stereotyping, given that we 
are promised “real” people in their “real” lives. Considering the overwhelming Orientalist 
history of representing Arabs, Iranians, and Muslims through tropes of exoticism, oppression, 
and violence (Shaheen, 2001), programs that present these identities “as they really are” have the 
potential to challenge stereotypes and expand the representational field. It has become clear, 
however, that reality television, like other genres of television, centers around narratives of 
conflict—both constructed and “real.” Far from providing accurate depictions, reality TV offers 
the kinds of representations and storylines to which audiences are deemed mostly likely to 
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respond—as reflected in three seasons of Shahs of Sunset and the one season of All-American 
Muslim. 
Both shows have met with criticism for perpetuating stereotypes. The represented 
communities themselves (Muslims in All-American Muslim and Iranians in Shahs of Sunset), 
hungry for representations that finally challenge their negative portrayals as religious extremists 
and terrorists, have been vocal critics. My focus here is not so much on whether the 
representation on each show was or is good or bad (though this question has been debated and 
will be discussed briefly), or even why one show failed while the other was renewed. My focus, 
rather, is on how each show reveals different strategies of representing difference and what these 
strategies tell us about the mechanisms and boundaries of inclusion in liberal multicultural 
America.  
Briefly, I argue that while All-American Muslim adopted a strategy of normalization that 
attempted to incorporate Islam into a narrow conception of American patriotism, Shahs of Sunset 
pursues a strategy of assimilatory exoticization that celebrates freedom (and all its excesses) and, 
crucially, decentralizes the question of Islam. Ultimately, I suggest that All-American Muslim 
failed to fit into a liberal multiculturalist framework because it showcased people for whom 
being Muslim mattered and, in doing so, it ran afoul of liberal multiculturalism’s assimilatory 
expectations. Conversely, Shahs of Sunset portrays people who embody relatable, arguably even 
quintessentially American vices, and is careful to avoid the one form of difference that cannot be 
assimilated: that of Islam. As such, both shows raise troubling questions about the place of Islam 
in U.S. liberal multiculturalism and the space afforded, if any, for specific forms of religious 
diversity within that vision.  
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In what follows, I provide a brief overview of TLC and Bravo’s branding formulas in 
order to understand how All-American Muslim and Shahs of Sunset fit within their respective 
network contexts. I then examine media critics’ and viewers’ comments and the controversies 
that developed around each show in order to provide a sense of their reception. Finally, I 
examine the ways in which Islam is represented (or not represented) in each show in order to 
unpack how the cultural politics of Islam in the U.S. play out on reality television. 
The Representational Landscape of Reality TV 
All-American Muslim (hereafter, AAM) was broadcast on The Learning Channel (TLC), while 
Shahs of Sunset (hereafter, SOS) is broadcast on Bravo. Both networks have rebranded 
themselves over the last few decades. From 2000–2005, TLC was known for shows that focused 
on making over one’s home, wardrobe, and fashion sense (e.g., Trading Spaces [Folson et. al., 
2000-2011] and What Not to Wear [Hakami, Tranter, Honig, & Vafiadis, 2003-2013]). In 2005, 
following the success of Jon & Kate Plus 8 (Hayes, 2007-2009), a show featuring a couple with 
eight children, TLC rebranded itself by offering family-centered series that focused on atypical 
families or extreme family situations (Brooks & Marsh, 2003, pp. 777–778). Produced by 
Dearborn native, Mike Mosallem, AAM was part of this larger theme of atypical families, as is its 
lead-in show, Sister Wives (Gibbons, Hayes, Poole, & Streb, 2010-present), which follows a 
polygamous Mormon family. According to media research company SNL Kagan, TLC now airs 
in 99 million homes in the United States. The network’s key demographic is women aged 18–34 
(Douglas, 2012, August 27), and its viewers tend to skew slightly to the right of the political 
spectrum (Khan, 2010, April 10). 
Though some of TLC’s shows are critiqued as presenting nonnormative people and 
lifestyles as “freaks,” senior vice president of production and development, Howard Lee, 
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disputes this. He describes the network as “captur[ing] the imagination of our public by showing 
you how other people live” (Villareal, 2012, August 29). Amy Winter, General Manager of TLC, 
in an interview about AAM, stated that “TLC has a track record of going into communities that 
people know very little about and opening them up for our viewers to experience” (Hultgren, 
2011, December 20). TLC tried to promote the show as part of a broader strategy supporting 
marginalized lifestyles, including those of polygamous Mormons (Sister Wives), the Amish 
(Breaking Amish [Evangelista & Evangelista, 2012-present]), and people diagnosed with 
dwarfism (Little People, Big World [Rosenthal, Weaver, Freed, Caprio, & Barrosse, 2006-
present]). Nonetheless, although AAM premiered to 1.7 million viewers, those numbers dropped 
to 58% (729,000) by the finale. In contrast, Sister Wives (Gibbons, Hayes, Poole, & Streb, 2010-
present), still airing and now in its sixth season, averages 2.1 million viewers. AAM was not 
renewed for a second season; it lasted for only eight episodes (Rice, 2012, March 7).  
If TLC’s shtick is normalizing the “abnormal,” then Bravo’s not-so-subtle strategy is 
presenting rich and glamorous lifestyles that the audience is often invited to “love to hate.”  
Today, Bravo’s programming explores five main “branches”: food, fashion, design, lifestyle, and 
pop culture (Bruce, 2012, January 4). Some of Bravo’s other reality show hits are Top Chef 
(Cutforth, 2006-present) and The Real Housewives of Orange County (Ross, Stewart, French, 
Lee, & Dunlop, 2006-2014). Bravo executives have coined the term “affluencers” to describe 
their audience (Copple Smith, 2012) and its appetite for elitist characters. The network currently 
reaches 88 million households, an audience comprised primarily of educated women and gay 
men with professional success and expensive taste (Copple Smith, 2012, p. 292). Bravo’s 
audience is among the most educated and affluent in America and they tend to vote Democrat 
(Becker, 2006, September 30; Bravo, 2011, December 14).  
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One of Bravo’s promotional strategies is to create like-minded programs that define its 
brand. We can see this strategy with Shahs of Sunset, which follows a very similar theme and 
format to the Real Housewives franchise and other Bravo reality television shows (Copple Smith, 
2012). SOS is produced by Ryan Seacrest, who is known for producing the reality TV hit 
Keeping Up with the Kardashians 2007-present) and its spin-off shows and for being the host of 
American Idol (Frot-Coutaz, 2002-present). In addition to being compared to Seacrest’s 
Kardashian franchise, SOS is also frequently compared to other successful reality shows: The 
Real Housewives franchise and MTV’s The Jersey Shore (Salsano, Jeffress, & French, 2009-
2012). Brand strategy advisers from Truth Consulting say that The Real Housewives franchise is 
successful because “people want to watch rich girls behaving badly” (Bruce, 2012, January 4). 
SOS appears to be tapping into this audience: At the time of this writing, it has been renewed for 
a fourth season.  
 
All-American Muslim 
 Premiering on the TLC network in November 2011, All-American Muslim chronicled the 
everyday lives of five Muslim families in Dearborn, Michigan. The show was unprecedented in 
its representation of Muslims on U.S. television, particularly in the ways it attempted to expand 
the representation of Muslim identities. For one, it offered the possibility of moving away from 
representing all Arab and Muslim characters in contexts exclusively focused on terrorism. 
Second, it portrayed Arabs and Muslims in leading roles, rather than their more frequent 
supporting or inconsequential roles. Third, it included diverse Muslim identities that ranged from 
more to less conservative: Two people had tattoos, one was scantily clad while another decided 
to don the hijab, and one was marrying an Irish-Catholic-American. 
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Almost as soon as it aired, AAM kindled unexpected controversy. Many Muslims had 
criticisms of the show. Some claimed that the cast was not composed of “real Muslims” because 
some had tattoos. Others claimed the show portrayed one Muslim community (Lebanese Shia) as 
representative of all Muslims in the U.S. One Muslim commenter on the entertainment website 
imdb.com stated that the show “is a joke and utter insult to the diversity that is Islam” and should 
be renamed “All-Lebanese American Shia Muslim” (Ztlfire, 2011). Such critiques served to 
highlight the impossible pressure on a single show to undo over a century of stereotypes 
(Shaheen, 2001). Muslim responses and criticisms of the show, however, did not enter 
mainstream conversations and remained largely internal to Muslim American communities.  
Less surprising were the negative responses from other kinds of viewers. It was precisely 
the show’s effort to offer a more nuanced and positive picture of Muslims in America that drew 
the ire of some, most notably the Florida Family Association (FFA) run by David Caton, a 
rightwing activist normally known more for his antigay agenda. In a strange twist of events 
antigay and anti-Muslim organizing converged by targeting the channel Media Studies scholars 
refer to as “the compulsory hetereosexuality channel” (Maher, 2004) for representing 
heterosexual Muslim families. In December 2011, the FFA organized an e-mail campaign 
protesting the show’s portrayal of Muslims as “deceptive” and calling on advertisers to withdraw 
their sponsorship. The FFA’s outrage was sparked because  AAM dared to portray Muslims 
outside of the context of terrorism. Since there are no terrorists on the show and Muslims are 
depicted as ordinary people, Caton charged that it was propaganda “attempting to manipulate 
Americans into ignoring the threat of jihad” (Tashman, 2011). Soon after the FFA’s campaign, 
the retailer Lowe’s Home Improvement and the travel website Kayak.com pulled their 
commercials.  
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Apparently, even this modest expansion in representing Muslims disturbed those who 
saw the show as denying the essential incompatibility of Islam and America. Even the Wall 
Street Journal faced the wrath of this audience when an article on the controversy described the 
show as reflecting the reality that “Islam in America today is a story of rapid assimilation and 
even secularization, not growing radicalism” (Riley, 2012, March 22). Online reader responses to 
the article included the following: 
I will happily sing the praises of middle class American Muslims as soon as middle class 
American Muslims denounce the jihad their brethren are leading against the rest of us. 
Until then, they are suspect. (Chris Henry, Comments on Riley, 2012, March 22) 
The Koran is not a book compatible with American middle-class values. Nor is the life of 
Mohammed. (Stephen Spencer, Comments on Riley, 2012, March 22) 
I wonder if the media will ever stop trying to brainwash us. Now, the drumbeat telling us 
Muslims are just nice American people trying to live normal lives. And we are being 
unfair … Sorry, but they are not ordinary Americans. They are engaged in a global 
religious war against us … we must be vigilant to not allow them to spread their violent 
religion and Sharia law in this our great and free nation. (Barbara LeBey, Comments on  
Riley, 2012, March 22) 
Such responses revealed the existence of an audience for whom any representational strategy that 
did not condemn all Muslims as inherently anti-American was unacceptable.  
 It is important to note, however, that this controversy also generated a sizeable backlash 
that critiqued Lowe’s and Kayak.com for their decision to withdraw sponsorship. A National 
Lowe’s Boycott Campaign was launched and hip-hop mogul Russell Simmons offered to 
purchase any remaining advertising space (Duke, 2011, December 13). Neither the FFA nor the 
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kind of vehemently anti-Muslim viewers described above should be read as representing the 
American public writ large, but they are, regrettably, part of a spectrum of attitudes in the U.S. 
today. To understand the show’s reception, in addition to looking at such extreme responses, we 
need to keep this larger spectrum in view and ask why the representational strategies of AAM 
failed to connect even with more moderate viewers, resulting ultimately in its cancellation.  
For all its effort to provide a more nuanced portrayal of Muslims, AAM relied in other 
ways on narrow representational strategies that have become standard fare in TV dramas since 
9/11/01—namely, the focus on Muslims as patriots and/or victims (Alsultany, 2012). Among the 
people featured on AAM are a police officer, a football coach, a county clerk, and a federal agent, 
mirroring the now-standard inclusion of “patriotic” American Muslim characters on fictional 
television shows. These portrayals, while certainly “positive,” reflect the ongoing demand for 
American Muslims’ to continually prove their patriotism. Victims also appear on AAM, but to a 
much lesser extent than the trope of patriotism. We witness discrimination and harassment when 
one of the married couples leaves Dearborn to visit a neighboring town, only to be ignored at a 
restaurant while other customers are offered seating (Mosallam et al., 2011, November 20), and 
when high school students recount being called “camel-jockeys” by students at other schools 
(Mosallam et al., 2011, November 13). The emphasis here is on the innocence of Muslim 
Americans, thus assuring viewers that not all Muslims are guilty or threatening.  
These representations of “patriots” and “victims” are undoubtedly improvements over 
past images of Muslims and Arabs as terrorists, oil sheiks, belly dancers, and oppressed, veiled 
women. Nonetheless, these “improvements” reveal an equally narrow and one-dimensional script 
of representation. By attempting to make Islam seem less frightening and more familiar through 
association with occupations and leisure activities that emphasize U.S. citizenship, AAM adopts a 
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strategy of normalization that distinguishes it from the other portrayals of alternative lifestyles 
and atypical families on the TLC network—and may help to explain why, in the end, the show 
failed to attract viewers.  
The most obvious comparison is with the show Sister Wives (Gibbons, Hayes, Poole, & 
Streb, 2010-present). In Sister Wives, the Brown family members are portrayed as unjust victims 
of prejudice given the stigmatization of their lifestyle in mainstream society. They cannot legally 
marry since polygamy is illegal, and they must hide their identity as a polygamous Mormon 
family from the general public and from the community in which they live. But while the Brown 
family is burdened to prove that they are simply living a nonnormative lifestyle and are not 
perverted religious fanatics, their religious difference does not demand that they also prove their 
patriotism or citizenship. In contrast, AAM’s focus on its cast members’ patriotism marks the 
show as distinct and reveals that Muslim identity, unlike Mormon identity, necessitates a 
framework that proves its protagonists are not just unfairly stigmatized, but also really and truly 
American.  
 To this end, AAM features “normal” people living a “normal” middle class life with very 
little conflict. The ironic result: The show was widely perceived as boring. The “difference” of 
being Muslim is featured—we see, for example, a 12-year-old girl putting on the hijab for the 
first time, an Irish American Catholic converting to Islam for marriage, conflict over having a 
dog as a domestic animal, and special accommodations at the high school for football training 
during Ramadan—but these instances of difference are normalized and seemingly neutralized by 
their familiar, domestic contexts. Discussing the show online, viewers seemed unanimous: 
Where were the exciting scenes of drunk people and screaming fights that characterized other 
reality shows?  On the Hollywood Reporter’s website (O’Connell, 2011, December 14), for 
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example, viewers commented:  “watched it once and was bored to death” and “It shows everyday 
people doing what … people do everyday. I don’t watch TV for that.”  
 Arguably, the show’s poor performance could be attributed to this normalcy and lack of 
melodrama. And if we were comparing All-American Muslim only with Shahs of Sunset and the 
kinds of shows featured on Bravo, this argument might make sense. Yet, recall that TLC’s 
particular reality television brand is not about drunken brawls or narcissists with abundant 
wealth. Rather, the focus is on marginalized and misunderstood lifestyles, and other TLC reality 
shows using this formula have been successful, thus the failure of AAM remains somewhat 
puzzling. Since reality television excels at selling lifestyles, not citizenship, perhaps AAM would 
have done better to follow the Sister Wives model of showcasing a marginalized religion and 
atypical lifestyle rather than attempting so earnestly to prove patriotic citizenship.  
I suggest, however, that the show’s demise followed not only from its failure to titillate 
and entertain, but also from its insistent linking of American identity and Islam. As the show’s 
title and its portrayal of the protagonists’ religious beliefs and practices demonstrated, the 
inclusion of Muslim Americans that the producers were promoting sought a delicate balancing 
act that embraced religious difference—specifically, Islam—as normal. While the term “All-
American” showcased the producers’ efforts to evoke the framework of patriotism, the term 
“Muslim” dared to foreground, rather than downplay, religious identity. This was, I argue, a 
risky representational strategy that inadvertently revealed the limits of liberal multiculturalism—
an idealized form of inclusion that remains ambivalent, at best, especially when it comes to 
Islam.  
 Raka Shome (2012) points out that parts of one’s identity that do not conform to the logic 
of multiculturalism, or shared notions of Americanness, are bracketed out in public discourse 
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“thus disallowing their interruptive political possibilities to emerge” (p. 156). Muslims can be 
included in liberal multiculturalism if their identities are watered down, hence the emphasis in 
AMM on patriotism. But what happens when Islam is not confined to the private lives of Muslim 
Americans, but seeps out into public life, such as changing the football team’s practice schedule 
during Ramadan? Might this constitute an interruptive possibility? Whether more critical 
possibilities could have emerged with a second or third season of AAM is unknown, given that 
the show was cancelled. 
 
Shahs of Sunset 
 While All-American Muslim’s title puts Islam front and center and attempts to announce 
its incorporation into a multicultural America, Shahs of Sunset’s title sidesteps Islam and plays 
into Orientalist discourse by evoking associations with royalty, rather than religion. The names 
of both shows immediately communicate certain expectations to viewers. In the case of SOS, 
viewers were invited to gaze upon vaguely Oriental others (the relations and distinctions between 
Arabs, Iranians, and Muslims being lost on most Americans) and provided with a familiar Bravo 
structure of feeling (characters you “love to hate”) through which to funnel any negative 
emotions.  
SOS focuses on six Iranian American friends whose families left Iran after the 1979 
Islamic Revolution and moved to Los Angeles, referred to as “Tehrangeles” for its large Iranian 
population. The cast members, in their mid to late 30s, single, and mostly employed in real 
estate, met while students at Beverly Hills High School and are portrayed as rich obnoxious 
narcissists. The season 1 trailer features GG saying, “There are two things I don’t like. I don’t 
like ants, and I don’t like ugly people” and Mike saying, “We don’t work in buildings, we own 
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them” (Sher et al., 2012). In the season 1 premier, GG says: “Looking good, and not repeating 
outfits, is imperative” and “I am a 30-year-old and my only paycheck is from my daddy” (Sher et 
al., 2012, March 11). Reviews and viewer comments focus on how shallow the show is and how 
despicable they find the cast, but SOS has, nonetheless, been popular. Whereas the AAM 
viewership and ratings did not merit a second season, SOS has been renewed for four seasons so 
far, with viewership consistently in the millions (Andreeva, 2012, April 17; Kondolojoy, 2013, 
November 6; Reality Tea, 2012, December 4).  
The show has not been without controversy, particularly regarding the extent to which it 
perpetuates stereotypes about Iranians as rich and materialistic, and whether this stereotype is 
“better” than that of Iranians as religious fundamentalist terrorists. Some critics say that the focus 
on rich materialistic people actually normalizes Iranian identity. The Boston Herald’s Mark 
Perigard (2012, March 11) states that the show “proves that materialism is an insidious infection 
in this nation, vanity crosses every culture and just about everyone behaves like a moron when a 
camera is pointed in their direction.”  Similarly, Pete Vonder Haar (2012, April 4) for The 
Houston Press writes that “the lesson of Shahs of Sunset, it would seem, is that the repulsiveness 
of rich people knows no ethnic or cultural boundaries”  
Whereas these “endorsements” are cynical, the cast members themselves are more 
optimistic about the show’s portrayal of Iranian Americans. Reza, a gay man from a Muslim and 
Jewish background, and the most frequently interviewed cast member, states:  
I would rather be associated with a stereotype like loving gold, loving Mercedes, loving 
columns. For me, personally, those things are all true. I don't want to be associated with a 
stereotype that I like blowing things up, that I'm a terrorist, that I'm militant, all the 
stereotypes that most of the United States think we're associated with. Because we're not. 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF ISLAM IN REALITY TV 15 
I love this country. I am so proud to call myself an American. I worship the ground that I 
walk on here and I don't take it for granted one minute. If I'm going to personify a 
stereotype, absolutely let me personify a harmless one that's accurate as opposed to a 
toxic one that's completely false. (Garvey, 2012, April 11)  
Still, the most vocal concerns regarding SOS have come from the Iranian American 
community itself. Shortly after the show premiered, petitions began circulating among the 
Iranian American community to get the show taken off the air. One petition, which collected 500 
signatures on Change.org, protested the show’s promotion of racial stereotypes. Jimmy Delshad, 
an Iranian American and former mayor of Beverly Hills, expressed concern that the show would 
“take us back and make us look like undesirable people” (“Time for a revolution?,” 2012, April 
21). The City of West Hollywood passed a resolution condemning SOS for perpetuating negative 
stereotypes.  
Yet, as numerous cultural theorists have pointed out, debating whether one stereotype is 
better or worse than another is not particularly productive (e.g., Grey, 2005; Shohat, 1989). A 
negative stereotype is defused not with a “better” stereotype, but with a diverse field of images. 
For the purposes of this article, the more pertinent question is not so much how SOS presents 
Iranian Americans, but how (or, indeed, whether) SOS presents Muslim Americans. The answer 
is complicated and warrants further elaboration, which I provide in the following section. On the 
one hand, SOS largely avoided the topic of Islam until season 3; on the other hand, whether 
avoiding Islam or addressing it directly, the show figures Islam as the binary opposite to 
American freedom. As a result, the cast of SOS is, ironically, read as “more American” than the 
cast of All-American Muslim. 
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Freedom (from Islam), Individualism, and Consumerism  
SOS is consistent with the “rich bitch” (Lee & Moscowitz, 2012, 15) genre of reality 
television that focuses on wealthy, narcissistic cast members and invites viewers to judge them. 
At the same time, the show also surprisingly pushes boundaries with its portrayal of interracial, 
interfaith, and gay relationships. Asa is dating Jermaine Jackson, Jr. (pop icon Michael Jackson’s 
nephew) and says that Persians look at her like she is a whore for dating an African American, 
but she critiques such judgments of two people who love each other (Sher et al., 2012, December 
23). Reza is the product of a Muslim-Jewish interfaith marriage; he is also gay and dating a white 
man. Mike is Jewish and his family expects him to marry an Iranian Jew, yet his girlfriend is 
Italian-American Catholic and converts to Judaism to be with him. Season 2 ends with Reza 
saying:  
I am so thankful that I am Persian, but American. Picture it, Persian New Year 2023: 
We’re all sitting around, I’ve got my white husband with me, Mike has got his Italian 
non-Jewish wife and their kids; Asa’s got Jermaine and their mixed children, and for GG 
and MJ and for all of us, it’s such a beautiful quilt. Love, family, that’s what makes you 
who you are. And a Hermes pocket square doesn’t hurt. (Sher et al., 2013, February 10)   
In such moments, SOS actually connects (albeit with tongue-in-cheek) to the interpersonal 
struggles—especially around interfaith and interracial relationships—that the cast members face 
despite their wealth. 
But while the show pushes some social boundaries, the one boundary it does not push is 
that around the cultural politics of Islam. Unlike the people featured in AAM, the cast members 
of SOS are not focused on proving their citizenship or patriotism. Nonetheless, other markers are 
used to provide just such proof—namely, binary discourses about American freedom in 
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comparison to Iran’s lack of freedom. When Asa is about to have her first musical performance, 
she reflects on the significance of the event happening in the U.S., as opposed to Iran: 
My mom says, “We left Iran so you can be free and you don’t have to wear chador.” 
Being free and not wearing a chador has a huge meaning. It’s not just a physical thing 
you wear. It’s being able to express yourself as being a woman, even being an artist. 
Being who I am. I couldn’t be me in Iran. Look at me. I would be an entirely different 
person. (Sher et al., 2013, February 10) 
In season 3, Asa says that you can get killed for being gay in the Middle East (Sher et al., 2013, 
December 8), and in other episodes she describes being “born Muslim” as a way to reference not 
being a practicing Muslim. Like “patriotism” in AAM, discourses about “freedom” in SOS 
indirectly and critically reference Islam, and it is this feature of freedom that serves as a proxy 
for one’s “Americanness.”  In this way, SOS departs from AAM’s strategy of normalization. By 
seeking not to present its protagonists as “regular people,” but as others who are exoticized as 
much by their wealth as their ethnicity, SOS cast members are assimilated in all the ways that 
matter—or more accurately, the one way that matters most. This strategy of assimilatory 
exoticization portrays the cast as exotic in that they sprinkle their English with Farsi words, like 
joon (dear) and heyvoon bazi (animal style), but assimilable Others, for whom Islam is not 
central part of their identity and who are openly critical of Iran.  
Instead, extravagant and conspicuous consumption is portrayed as central to the cast 
members’ identities and lifestyles—a strategy that cultural theorists such as Inderpal Grewal 
have noted for its ability to produce liberal subjects (2005). Multiculturalism operates as a 
technology of hegemony, offering opportunities for racialized and gendered subjects to be 
interpellated into American identity through consumerism and consumer culture’s emphasis on 
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“choices” (Grewal, 2005, p. 200). According to Grewal, American identity, especially notions of 
the American Dream, are deeply bound to consumer culture. The very phrase “American 
Dream,” she argues, “connotes much more explicitly the close relationship between American 
national identity and consumer culture, as well as the ways in which American identity [is] a 
form of consumer nationalism” (Grewal, 2005, p. 206). In SOS, we see the cast members 
embrace the American Dream and become ideal subjects of U.S. multiculturalism through 
consumerism, secularism, and disavowal of Islam. 
The cast members who are Muslim do not observe Muslim holidays. When it is 
mentioned, it is part of one’s background or heritage, but not part of their current lives. In 
contrast, Jewish holidays are observed and viewers have the opportunity to attend Shabbat dinner 
at Mike’s parents’ house and Reza’s father’s house. Jewishness is normalized (or at least a 
version of it that involves observing the holidays and a stated same-faith marital preference that 
is not observed by the cast members), yet there are no parallels with Islam. It is as if the cast 
members left their “Muslim-ness” in Iran with the revolution. Coming to America is portrayed as 
the realization of a dream about freedom—the freedom to drink; the freedom to be sexually 
promiscuous; the freedom to have interfaith, interracial, and gay relationships; the freedom to be 
a rich consumerist narcissist; and perhaps most importantly, the freedom to practice one’s 
Muslim faith as one wishes or, better yet, not at all.  
Interestingly, despite the show’s efforts to avoid or absent Islam for the first two seasons, 
some viewers still imposed this lens—with surprising results. The moderator of 
barenakedislam.com, an anti-Islam website whose tagline is, “It isn’t Islamophobia when they 
REALLY are trying to kill you,” actually defended SOS, initiating a debate while arguing that 
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the cast members laudably refer to themselves as American and their Islam is downplayed (Bare 
Naked Islam, 2012, March 8 and 12):  
Yes, most of them are rich and spoiled (like the Housewives casts) but you never think of 
them as Muslims, only Americans of Iranian/Persian descent. The women wear sexy 
clothes, they play music, dance, sing, have sex, and drink liquor often. The character 
Reza is gay and one of the women said about him, “If Reza lived in Iran now, they would 
kill him for being gay.”  I said it after I saw the previews of this show and I can confirm it 
now, if all Muslims in America had the attitudes of these people, blogs like this one 
would not exist. 
Apparently for the moderator, drinking, dancing, having sex, and women wearing provocative 
clothing signify “American freedom” and thus operate as a proxy for “American patriotism” in 
the context of Islam. Some members of the site reacted with surprise that the moderator would 
actually praise a show that contains Muslims:  
…you cannot trust any muslim and should not affiliate with any of them….and all their 
“places of battle” aka mosques / aka masjids should be razed to the ground in this and 
every country. let them live in a little sand patch isolated from civilization somewhere 
where they have no interaction whatsoever to do with any of US. honestly, when i read 
this article … i’m wondering is this site hacked [sic]. (Michelle, Comments on Bare 
Naked Islam, March 8) 
The moderator of Bare Naked Islam elaborated on her/his position: 
 
It is a chance to see at least a few Muslims who don’t consider themselves Muslims first 
and Americans last. They have embraced an American lifestyle where religion doesn’t 
dictate every move they make. They dress like Americans instead of 7th century 
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throwbacks, they have fun like Americans, and don’t force little girls to cover their heads, 
or think that the way Americans dress is immoral. And you can bet they have a few pet 
dogs in the family. I doubt they are demanding special treatment and accommodations for 
their religious needs from non-Muslims. There’s even a storyline about a romance 
between a Muslim woman and a Jewish man. If they get serious, I doubt we’ll see the 
Jewish man converting to Islam. (barenakedislam, Comments on Bare Naked Islam, 
March 8) 
With these implicit references to All-American Muslim—which showed, as mentioned earlier, a 
12-year-old girl putting on the hijab for the first time, an Irish American Catholic converting to 
Islam for marriage, conflict over having a dog as a domestic animal, and special 
accommodations at the high school for football training during Ramadan—the moderator makes 
clear that while the cast of AAM are a threat to America because they are observant Muslims, the 
cast of SOS are acceptable Americans because Islam is insignificant to their lives.  
 Such notions reflect contemporary liberalism’s reliance on a basic opposition: “the 
opposition between those who are ruled by culture, totally determined by the life-world into 
which they were born, and those who merely ‘enjoy’ their culture, who are elevated above it, 
free to choose their culture” (Žižek, 2007, p. 1). Žižek (2007) elaborates that in liberalism, 
culture is privatized, becoming “an expression of personal and private idiosyncrasies” (p. 1). In 
this way, the individual is prioritized over the collective. In both AMM and SOS, cast members 
negotiate this tension between individual and collective identities and desires. For example, in 
AMM, we watch Shadia’s fiancée convert to Islam and in SOS, we watch Mike’s girlfriend 
prepare to convert to Judaism. However, in AMM religion moves beyond a private idiosyncrasy 
when the football team’s practice schedule changes during Ramadan or when a female cast 
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member is unable to open a nightclub. In contrast, the cast members of SOS embrace 
individualism over the collective and are positively portrayed as being “above” religion. Indeed, 
it is possible that AMM failed because the cast members, for all their normalcy and patriotism, 
failed to capture the individualist ideals of liberalism by remaining too tied to their families and a 
collective Muslim community. SOS cast members, conversely, embrace consumerism, 
secularism, and free choice; culture is a vehicle to build a community, but it does not rule their 
choices or take priority over their individuality. 
 When SOS finally does address Islam explicitly, it does so in ways that reveal its deep 
ambivalence. This does not happen until season 3 and is confined to two episodes in which the 
cast members travel to Turkey (Sher et al., 2014, January 28 and February 4). Most of the cast 
members have not returned to Iran since they fled the country as children as a result of the 1979 
revolution, nor have they traveled to any Muslim country. Each cast member has a different 
reaction to being in Turkey, seeing women in hijabs and niqabs, and hearing the call to prayer. 
These episodes finally provide an opening for a conversation about Islam and feature a range of 
reactions on the part of the cast members. The dominant message, however, remains consistent: 
Islam is essentially unfree and incompatible with American values. 
At one point, the three women cast members are moved when they hear the call to prayer 
and connect with it as something beautiful (Sher et al., 2014, January 28). MJ says:  
When you’re a Muslim kid in America and you look like this, you hide it. When I’m 
asked if I’m Muslim, I respond yes, but. I always said yes, but I’m not practicing. Yes, 
but I’m not Islamic. Yes, because I’m afraid that I’m gonna be labeled as a terrorist. And 
for the first time in my life there was no shame attached to being a Muslim.  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF ISLAM IN REALITY TV 22 
GG is moved to tears by the call to prayer. She says: “In Iran, everyday you hear that prayer 
everywhere. And that sound, it knocked the wind out of me.” Asa connects deeply with the call 
to prayer as part of her heritage and the three women stand outside of the mosque together with 
tears in their eyes. 
However, this profound moment of portraying the Muslim call to prayer as beautiful is 
quickly tempered by Reza and Mike’s reactions. Echoing some of the most common, monolithic 
portrayals of Islam in the U.S., Reza reads the call as antigay, while Mike reacts to it as anti-
Semitic:  
Reza: Hearing the call to prayer was jarring. I was worried that I’m a gay man standing 
outside of a mosque hearing this call to prayer and I’m thinking, if these people had x-ray 
vision and knew who I really was, would they start throwing stones at me? 
Mike: No disrespect to Muslims but it scared the hell out of me. People are just rushing 
into the mosque. I got this overwhelming feeling inside of me that I couldn’t help. I felt 
like a little kid that had lost his mom and dad and was looking for them. It was really 
weird.… At this very given moment, I’m feeling more Jewish than I am feeling Iranian. 
Because of my religion, I could have left Iran and went to Israel if I chose to because they 
would have taken me in. My country didn’t want me, but my religion does. If I had to 
fight for one or the other, I would fight for Israel. (Sher et al., 2014, January 28) 
Reza’s comment underlines the notion that Islam is against freedom and that it is only in the 
United States that he can be himself as a gay man (putting aside the fact that until very recently 
gay marriage was a highly controversial issue in the US). Similarly, Mike’s comments affirm the 
idea that the US and Israel are closely aligned because they share values that are incompatible 
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with “the Muslim world.”  The US and Israel thus represent freedom and democracy while the 
Middle East represents their opposite. 
In addition to affirming the notion that Islam is antigay and anti-Semitic, these episodes 
of SOS also affirm Islam as oppressive to women. Asa, MJ, and Golnesa are moved by the call to 
prayer—until they enter the mosque. There, they respond to gender segregation with 
disappointment and alienation. The association of Islam with the oppression of women continues 
during a conversation about the hijab and niqab. Reza states that the niqab freaks him out (Sher 
et al., 2014, February 4), while GG and Asa try to offer a more nuanced point of view, noting the 
niqab’s cultural significance and critiquing only its mandatory imposition. But Reza remains 
adamant: 
No. I don’t like it aesthetically. I don’t like it symbolically. I don’t like it religiously. I 
don’t like it oppressively. I don’t like anything it stands for. It separates people. It’s such 
an in your face: We are this way, you guys are that way. I hate that. (Sher et al., 2014, 
February 4) 
Reza then draws an analogy between the niqab and living one’s life in the closet—further 
conflating Islam with homophobia.  
 Reza’s positionality is important to consider, not least because, as noted above, he is the 
most frequently interviewed and popular cast member. He also embodies what Jasbir Puar (2013) 
refers to as homonationalism and what Ali Behdad and Juliet A. Williams (2010) refer to as neo-
Orientalism. He produces an ideology within his gay subjectivity that replicates dominant 
discourses about Islam that justify U.S. intervention and invasion. Given that he is a native 
informant, his narrative of U.S. progress and modernity in opposition to Iran-Islam, holds 
“authenticity” or credibility. In this case, Reza, our homontionalist is of Iranian-Muslim descent 
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and his explicit disavowal of Islam is a crucial component to establishing his homonormativity 
and Americanness. His performance of nationalism positions him as a “real American” by 
delineating which kinds of Muslims should and should not be included in the land of the free. 
The season ends with Reza proposing marriage to his gay partner, the ultimate sign of 
homonationalism and American freedom (Sher et al., 2014, February 11). Reza embodies 
Americanness in his affirmation of Orientalist discourses about the backward nature of Islam and 
his embrace of American sexual freedom and consumerist lifestyle.  
It is important to emphasize, however, that what makes SOS both popular and 
(problematically) powerful is not its overtly anti-Iran/anti-Muslim moments, but its delivery of 
such sentiments through the discourse of liberal multiculturalism. Shome (2012) writes that a 
“striking thing about the narrativization of multiculturalism in public discourses in the United 
States […] [is how it] is often used as evidence of its tolerance and openness in relation to many 
“other worlds”—today, especially Muslim worlds—whose cultures are dismissed as monolithic, 
rigid, backwards, and closed” (p. 153). Furthermore, both Sara Ahmed and Žižek point out that 
the logic of multiculturalism allows racism to be articulated under the guise of free speech, as 
signifying freedom in a democratic system (Ahmed 2008, p. 2; Žižek, 2009, p. 3). Reza and 
Mike exemplify this double move of multiculturalism. On the one hand, they are incorporated 
into liberal multiculturalism as subjects of difference, epitomizing U.S. multicultural 
exceptionalism. On the other hand, they represent ideal subjects of liberal multiculturalism 
through their expression of Islamophobia and disdain of the collective in Islam. As an Iranian-
Muslim and Iranian-Jewish other, respectively, their inclusion as acceptable is leveraged against 
the imagined intolerance of those other Iranian/Muslim Others whose identities and affinities 
challenge the limits and expectations of liberal multiculturalism.  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF ISLAM IN REALITY TV 25 
Reality Television and the Cultural Politics of Islam 
In the context of the cultural politics of Islam in American, same-sex, interfaith, and interracial 
relationships are portrayed as symbols of American freedom and progress in contexts referencing 
Islam, eliding the contestation of such issues within the U.S. itself. In a sense, SOS succeeded 
and AAM did not because of how each engaged with the tension between being Muslim and 
being American. It seems that Muslims can be included in liberal multiculturalism only when 
and if Islam is, at minimum, not that important to their identity, and ideally, completely 
irrelevant. To put it more bluntly, while All-American Muslim failed in its attempt to make Islam 
palatable by wrapping it in a patriotic American flag, Shahs of Sunset won viewers and approval 
by driving away from Islam in a Mercedes Benz. 
The very existence of these two reality television shows functions as a signifier of 
multicultural progress by representing Muslims as Americans during a time when the place of 
Muslims in the US remains, in real reality, deeply contested. As Shome has written, the logic of 
multiculturalism in the US presents itself as a progressive and universal concept for remedying 
racism worldwide, when it is actually nation- and West-centric (2012, p. 145). Examination of 
these two shows reveals the limits of liberal multiculturalism. Both series demonstrate, in 
different ways, the ways in which multiculturalism tames difference rather than celebrates it, 
produces consumerism over rights, and operates to promote the US as exceptional. Just because 
Muslims are incorporated into reality television, does not necessarily signify progress towards 
racial justice. Ultimately, the shows show the need for a more complicated understanding of 
representation that goes beyond the dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion. American media can 
now accommodate Middle Eastern Americans and, to some extent, the representations are 
diversifying, but the boundaries of this newfound “acceptance” remain firmly circumscribed by 
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the cultural politics of Islam in America. Reality television has the potential to make certain 
lifestyles more acceptable, including that of gays, lesbians, Mormons, and Muslims. And while 
only one or two shows cannot change a representational field, AAM and SOS have created 
important openings for future representations of Islam in the U.S. media, even as they have also 
raised more troubling questions.  
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